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W
ith high food prices threatening the food security of millions of vulnerable 
households around the world, hunger and malnutrition are back in the headlines. 
The world is making only slow progress in reducing food insecurity, according to 
the Global Hunger Index (GHI). some regions—in particular south and southeast asia, the 
near east and north africa, and latin america and the Caribbean—have made significant 
headway in combating hunger and malnutrition since 1990, but in south asia and 
sub-saharan africa, the GHI remains high. moreover, 
progress in sub-saharan africa since 1990 has been marginal.
The GHI is a tool developed by IFPrI for regularly tracking 
the state of global hunger and malnutrition. This year’s index 
reflects data until 2006—the most recent available global 
data—and does not yet take account of the latest changes in 
the world food system, in which a number of factors are 
converging to raise prices for agricultural commodities to 
their highest levels in decades. Food prices appear likely to 
remain high in the near term, leading to food and nutrition 
insecurity for poor people around the globe. In this risky and 
changing environment, the GHI highlights key trends and the 
geographic areas of greatest vulnerability.
THe CHallenGe oF HunGer
The 2008 Global Hunger Index
IFPRI Issue Brief 54 • October 2008   2
Global and Regional TRends
At a global level, the 2008 GHI shows some improvement 
over the 1990 GHI, falling from 18.7 to 15.2 or by almost 
one fifth. The improvement was driven to a large extent 
by progress in children’s nutrition. Nevertheless, the GHI 
level in the world as a whole remains serious. These global 
averages hide dramatic differences among regions and 
countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa the GHI decreased by 
less than 11 percent between 1990 and 2008, whereas 
the GHI decreased by about 25 percent in South Asia and 
about 30 percent in Southeast Asia, the Near East, and 
North Africa. Progress in Latin America was even greater, 
with the GHI decreasing by almost 40 percent, albeit from 
an already low level.
Although Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia share the 
highest regional GHI scores (23.3 and 23.0 respectively), 
food insecurity in the two regions stems from different 
sources (Figure 1). In South Asia, the major problem is 
a high prevalence of underweight in children under five, 
which stems from the lower nutritional and educational 
status of women. In contrast, the high GHI in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is due to high child mortality and a high proportion 
of people who cannot meet their calorie requirements. 
Low government effectiveness, conflict, and political 
instability, as well as high rates of HIV/AIDS, have driven 
these two indicators.
From the 1990 GHI to the 2008 GHI, only a handful 
of countries made significant progress by reducing their 
GHI scores by half or more. At the same time, about one 
third of the countries made modest progress by reducing 
their GHI scores between 25 and 50 percent. Ghana was 
the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that cut its GHI 
by more than 40 percent. The countries that cut their 
GHI the most were Kuwait (which reduced its GHI by 
72 percent), Peru (71 percent), Syria (53 percent), Egypt 
(53 percent), and Turkey (51 percent). Kuwait’s seemingly 
remarkable progress in reducing hunger is mainly due 
to its unusually high level in 1990, when Iraq invaded 
the country. Peru made rapid progress through strong 
agricultural growth and the lowering of inflation. 
It is laudable that some countries were able to cut 
their GHI by more than half, but absolute progress 
in moving toward such a goal is also noteworthy. 
Between 1990 and 2008, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Peru, and Vietnam saw the largest 
decreases—by more than 10 points—in their GHI scores. 
In 11 countries (all in Sub-Saharan Africa, except for 
North Korea), the GHI increased. 
The countries with the most worrisome hunger 
status and the highest 2008 GHI scores are predominantly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Eritrea, Burundi, Niger, and Sierra Leone at the 
bottom of the list (see Figure 2). War and violent conflict 
have been major causes of widespread poverty and food 
insecurity in most of the countries with high GHI scores. 
The greatest increases in GHI occurred in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (increase of 57 percent), North Korea 
(43 percent), Swaziland (32 percent), Burundi (17 percent), 
and Zimbabwe (17 percent).
The GHI is a multidimensional approach to measuring hunger and 
malnutrition that combines three equally weighted indicators:
1. the proportion of undernourished as a percentage of the 
population (reflecting the share of the population with insufficient 
dietary energy intake);
2. the prevalence of underweight in children under the age of five 
(indicating the proportion of children suffering from weight loss 
and/or reduced growth); and
3. the mortality rate of children under the age of five (partially 
reflecting the fatal synergy between inadequate dietary intake 
and unhealthy environments).
The index ranks countries on a 100-point scale, with 0 being the best score (no hunger) and 100 being the 
worst, though neither of these extremes is achieved in practice. 
Data for the 2008 GHI are from 2001 to 2006. The 2008 GHI is calculated for 120 countries for which data 
on the three components are available and measuring hunger is considered most relevant.





























Figure 1—Contribution of the Three Indicators to the 1990 GHI and 2008 GHI
Figure 2—2008 GHI by severity
Note: For the 1990 GHI, data on the proportion of undernourished are for 1990–92; data on the prevalence of underweight in children under five are for 
1988–92; and data on child mortality are for 1990. For the 2008 GHI, data on the proportion of undernourished are for 2002–04, data on child mortality are 
for 2006, and data on child malnutrition are for the latest year in the period 2001–2006 for which data are available.
Note: For the 2008 GHI, data on the proportion of undernourished are for 2002–04, 
data on child mortality are for 2006, and data on child malnutrition are for the latest 
year in the period 2001–2006 for which data are available.3 4
The Vicious CiRCle of HungeR  
and PoveRTy
Poverty leads to undernutrition and food insecurity by 
limiting poor people’s access to food. At the same time, 
because undernourished people are less productive and 
child malnutrition has severe, permanent consequences 
for physical and intellectual development, hunger can lead 
to or help entrench poverty. Thus poverty and hunger can 
become entwined in a vicious cycle, and levels and trends 
in these indicators can be expected to be similar. Indeed, 
countries with high levels of hunger are overwhelmingly 
low- or low-middle-income countries. All countries with 
extremely alarming levels of hunger are low-income 
countries.
Not surprisingly then, Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia are not only the regions with the highest GHI scores, 
but also the ones with the highest poverty rates. The share 
of the total population living on less than US$1 a day in 
2004 was 41 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 31 percent 
in South Asia, yet the GHI scores for the two regions are 
nearly equal. The trends in poverty and hunger reduction 
in the two regions, however, are different in magnitude. 
South Asia’s GHI and poverty rate reflect rapid progress 
since 1990 from very high levels, whereas in Sub-Saharan 
Africa the GHI has decreased much more slowly and 
poverty has been persistent.
Why are hunger and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 
so entrenched? Of the 969 million poor people in 
the developing world in 2004, 162 million were ultra 
poor—that is, they were living on less than $0.50 a day. 
These ultra poor are overwhelmingly concentrated in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Their extreme poverty makes it next 
to impossible for them to climb out of poverty: they find 
themselves unable to invest in assets and in educating 
their children; they have little access to credit; and hunger 
and malnutrition reduce their productivity. Extreme 
poverty thus becomes a trap in which poverty begets 
poverty and hunger begets hunger.
RisinG food PRiCes inTensify 
THe HungeR CRisis
Until recently, efforts to reduce hunger and malnutrition 
took place in an environment of gradually falling food 
prices. Between 1974 and 2005, real food prices declined 
by about 75 percent, according to the International 
Monetary Fund. Since 2005, however, real food prices have 
been on the rise. The Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations’ food price index rose by 9 percent 
in 2006, 23 percent in 2007, and more than 50 percent 
between May 2007 and May 2008. Virtually every food 
commodity has been affected by rising prices. Prices of 
wheat and poultry have doubled since 2003, and prices 
of maize and butter have tripled, and the price of rice has 
more than quadrupled.
Higher food prices have uneven effects across 
countries, depending on a range of factors. One such 
factor is whether countries are net importers or 
exporters of cereals, an indicator that reveals their 
vulnerability to rising cereal prices. Net exporters, like 
Argentina and Kazakhstan, tend to benefit from improved 
terms of trade, whereas net importers, like Angola, Chad, 
Burundi, and Ethiopia, struggle to meet domestic food 
demand. Net cereal importers in the sample significantly 
outnumber exporters (97 net importers and 15 net 
exporters), implying that many more countries still 
combating hunger are likely to suffer from higher prices 
than benefit from them. In fact, higher food prices will 
probably hit countries with the highest rates of hunger 
hardest, given that none of the countries with extremely 
alarming GHI—Burundi, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger, and Sierra Leone—are net 
cereal exporters.
The rise in food prices also undermines political 
security, which has a strong two-way link with food 
security. From January 2007 to June 2008, one third of 
all countries for which 2008 GHI was calculated had 
a violent or nonviolent protest. Food protests have 
affected countries with both high and low GHI scores. 
Interestingly, however, none of the countries with an 
extremely alarming GHI had experienced violent protests. 
With increased food price inflation, urban dwellers are 
usually the group that responds with strikes, protests, or 
riots. The rural poor, however, usually suffer silently for a 
while, and a lack of protests may not correctly depict the 
severity of impact on the poorest of the poor.
PRosPecTs foR food and 
nuTRiTion seCuRiTy 
undeR HigH food 
PRiCes
Even though the GHI has been falling slowly since 1990, 
at least 800 million people were food insecure before the 
food price crisis hit. In other words, 800 million people 
could not afford an adequate diet even in the context of 
declining food prices. Some poor people in developing 
countries spend as much as 70 percent of their incomes 
on food. People who were already food insecure have 
little or no scope for achieving nutritious diets in the face of rising food prices. Most of the world’s poor people are 
net buyers of food, even in rural areas, where millions of 
people do not own land or do not produce enough food 
to feed their families. These net food buyers are likely 
to see the greatest impacts on their nutritional status, 
and news reports show that they are already spending 
more on food, cutting back on their consumption, and 
sometimes reducing the quality of the food they eat.
Farmers who are net food producers could benefit 
from the higher prices for their food commodities, but 
these farmers are often not the poorest. Well-off farmers 
in China and Kenya, for example, are moving into higher-
value products to take advantage of rising prices. Still, 
according to the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, in many countries consumer prices have 
risen more than producer prices. With producer price 
increases lagging behind consumer price increases, even 
net food producers may come out behind.
High prices also reduce the amount of food aid 
that assistance agencies can buy with fixed budgets, and 
reduced food aid flows threaten people who are in crisis 
or disaster and depend on food aid for their survival. 
Largely because of rising food prices, food aid flows from 
the World Food Programme declined by 15 percent in 
2007, reaching their lowest level since 1961.
The greatest long-term damage from higher food 
prices may come from impacts on poor infants and 
children. Children have specific nutritional needs for 
macro- and micronutrients to ensure optimal physical 
and cognitive development, especially from conception 
to age two. Failure to meet these needs—for instance, if 
food price increases lead to diminished food quantity or 
quality—may have permanent consequences that include 
stunting, reduced cognition, and increased susceptibility to 
infectious disease and mortality.
new PoliCies needed
This is a period of great risk for the nutrition and health 
of millions of poor people, and policymakers need to act 
carefully (IFPRI, Welthungerhilfe, and Concern Worldwide 
have all proposed complementary policy responses; see 
the boxes for details). It is crucial that responses to the 
crisis go beyond good intentions and lofty declarations 
to include actions, even in politically challenging policy 
areas like trade and biofuels. Much discussion of the crisis 
so far has failed to assign specific responsibilities for 
implementation to specific actors, and this omission needs 
to be corrected so that governments and international 
institutions can be held accountable for their actions.
Governments and nongovernmental organizations 
must of course address the urgent and immediate needs 
for food among poor people, but if they ignore long-
term solutions, such as boosting agricultural production, 
strengthening social protection, and reforming trade rules 
and biofuel policies, they risk ensuring that hunger and 
malnutrition will recur. By highlighting the weaknesses 
of the current world food system, the food price crisis 
could serve as a catalyst for building a more effective and 
resilient food system that meets the food and nutrition 
needs of all people. The Global Hunger Indexes of the 
next several years—and decades—will reveal whether the 
world’s decisionmakers have seized this opportunity.
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IFPRI has proposed two sets of policy actions—an 
emergency package and a resilience package. 
 
The emergency package of actions to take 
immediately consists of the following:
1.  Expand emergency responses and humanitarian 
assistance to food-insecure people. 
2.  Eliminate agricultural export bans and export 
restrictions. 
3.  Undertake fast-impact food production programs 
in key areas. 
4.  Change biofuel policies. 
The resilience package of actions to phase in now, 
but whose impact will take longer to be felt, consists 
of the following:
5.  Calm markets with the use of market-oriented 
regulation of speculation, shared public grain 
stocks, strengthened food-import financing, and 
reliable food aid. 
6.  Invest in social protection. 
7.  Scale up investments for sustained agricultural 
growth. 
8.  Complete the Doha Round of World Trade 
Organization negotiations. 
IFPrI’s TWo-PronGeD PolICy PaCkaGe1.  In the short term, the poor need access to 
emergency supplies of food or cash with which to 
buy food, and donors should thus provide increased 
funding to the World Food Programme (WFP) to 
provide food aid to those who need it.
2.  Support should be provided to governments of 
developing countries so they can establish cash-
based social protection systems to ensure that the 
very poorest people can meet their basic needs.
3.  Nutritional surveillance in developing countries by 
Ministries of Health and other institutions needs to 
be supported and scaled up so that policymakers 
and others can identify the local impacts of the 
crisis. 
4.  Low-cost inputs or stronger credit programs should 
be provided to small and marginal farmers to give 
them better access to seeds, tools, and fertilizers. 
5.  In the short term, the United States and the 
European Union should review their biofuel policies, 
including the impact of inappropriate targets for 
biofuel production. 
6.  In the longer term, governments in the poorest 
countries, with the support of the international 
community, must reinvest in agriculture, and 
in particular in the food security of the most 
vulnerable populations and the productivity of 
marginal farmers.
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1. Food aid needs to be linked to development 
measures ensuring food security. 
2.  Rural development must again become a focal point 
of development cooperation, and more money must 
be provided for agriculture. 
3.  Governments of developing countries need to 
invest in rural infrastructure, promote farmers’ 
organizations, allow access to land and agricultural 
inputs, improve processing, and promote 
transportation and store keeping.
4.  More emphasis must be put on rural research and 
technical advice to increase worldwide production 
and productivity. 
5.  Investment is needed in education and health. 
  6.  Fair trade is a must for developing countries; the 
European Union and the industrialized countries 
must cancel their import restrictions and abolish 
agricultural export subsidies.
  7.  Social security systems have to be established to 
protect the needy in times of crisis. 
  8.  Biofuel production in the industrialized countries 
based on imports from developing countries should 
be deferred and reconsidered. 
  9.  Consumers in industrialized countries have to get 
used to higher food prices, and farming must pay for 
itself without subsidies.
10.  Nongovernmental organizations, which help 
organize farmers and highlight rural people’s 
concerns, must be strengthened. 
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